


# 6. Changes in Thinking and Emotion

- Willingness to argue diminishes
- Becomes more humorless, strident, with dogmatic preaching
- Beliefs become more rigid, simplistic, and absolute
- Embraces a “moral authority:” don’t think, just believe
- Common to all fundamentalist beliefs, regardless of content of the beliefs

# Fantasy

- “Narcissistic linking fantasy:” a special and idealized relationship with another (Meloy, 1998)
- Who? A leader, religious figure, political figure, soldier, assassin, warrior, older sibling, father, etc.
- Usually omnipotent, grandiose and violent fantasies
- Compensates for chronic real world failures and depleted narcissism in day to day experiences
- Identification warning behavior (Meloy et al., 2015)



Tamerlan's SMS to his mom :


*"My dear mom, I will lay down my life for Islam.  
I'm gonna die for Islam Inshaa Allah"*

# Emotion

- Sensitized to rejection, leading to anger or rage at blamed object, a defense against shame
- Secrecy leads to “clandestine excitement” (R. Collins, Univ. Pennsylvania)


Moral emotion sequence

- Anger > contempt > disgust




# anger


- ① eyebrows down and together
- ② eyes glare
- ③ narrowing of the lips



## contempt

① lip corner tightened and raised on only one side of face





# disgust

① nose wrinkling

② upper lip raised

# Matsumoto Studies

- Matsumoto et al., J Applied Social Psychology, 2016, in press
- Matsumoto et al., Current Directions in Psychological Science, 24:369-373, 2015
  - ANCODI tested with Nazis and Gandhi followers
  - All three elevated 3 months prior to violent event
  - Only anger elevated prior to nonviolent event


# 7. Failure of Sexual Pair-Bonding

- Absence of a sexual pair-bond from puberty until death or terrorist offense.

# Anders Breivik



# Eric Rudolph



# Buford Furrow



# Malik Hasan



# Timothy McVeigh



# Mohamed Atta and Marwan Al-Shehhi



# Ted Kaczynski





# 8. Mental Disorder

- Presence of a mental disorder by history or at the time of the offense. Nexus: ideology may provide a rationalization for symptoms of mental disorder, and intellectually buffer and help manage the anxiety of a decompensating mind

# Corner & Gill, Law and Human Behavior, 2014


- 119 lone terrorists vs. matched sample of group based terrorists
- 13.49 times more likely to have a mental illness than group based terrorists
- 18.07 times more likely to have a partner involved in the wider movement than group based terrorist
- Proximate upcoming life change
- Victim of recent prejudice
- Proximate and chronic stress



# Sirhan Sirhan

- Defense: paranoid schizophrenia and dissociative disorder
- Prosecution: borderline schizophrenia (borderline personality disorder) with histrionic and paranoid features
- Retaliation for betrayal of his person (transference) and of his people (Palestinians-Arabs) by Robert Kennedy
- Avenging the Six Day War in 1967 which Israel won





# Ted Kaczynski


- Court-ordered evaluation: paranoid schizophrenia; paranoid personality disorder with avoidant and antisocial features (S. Johnson psych report)
- Identification with the Luddites, 19<sup>th</sup> century British textile workers who protested technology, and hatred of advancing “technological society”



# 9. Greater Creativity and Innovation

- No bureaucratic stifling due to need for approval by those in charge of terrorist organization
- Absence of fear of failure
- No need to consider political, military, or social blowback from attack (Simon, Sageman)
- Operational definition: innovative and/or imitated

# Bruce Ivins, Ph.D.



# Bruce Ivins

- Anthrax attacks, two waves, in September and October, 2001: killed 5 people, injured 17
- Most prominent anthrax researcher in USG
- Motivated by:
  - Revenge
  - Need for personal validation
  - Career preservation and professional redemption
  - Loss
  - Also obsessed with and stalked a sorority house
    - Expert Behavioral Analysis Panel (2011)

# Lee Malvo and John Mohammad



# Washington, DC, Oct., 2002, 10 killed, 3 wounded



# Inspire Magazine

## Make a bomb in the kitchen of your Mom The AQ Chef

Can I make an effective bomb that causes damage to the enemy from ingredients available in any kitchen in the world? The answer is yes. But before how, we ask why? It is because Allah ﷻ says: **So fight in the cause of Allah; you are not held responsible except for yourself. And inspire the believers (to join you) that perhaps Allah will restrain the (military) might of those who disbelieve. And Allah is greater in might and stronger in (exemplary) punishment (an-Nisā: 84).**

© DOJ



# Added more explosive powder and altered detonation device



# 10. History of criminal violence

- History of instrumental criminal violence
- Emotion (anger) dissolves as mode of violence shifts to predation, and planning and preparation begins
- Serves tactical success by surprising target
- Morally sanctioned by belief system: superego-driven homicidal aggression; usually not valueless psychopathic predation, but may be

# Charlie Hebdo, January, 2015



# TRAP-18: Terrorist Radicalization Assessment Protocol

- What it is:
  - An investigative template
- What it is becoming:
  - A validated risk assessment instrument (SPJ)

# TRAP-18:

## Proximal Warning Behaviors (8)

- Pathway
- Fixation
- Identification
- Novel aggression
- Energy burst
- Leakage
- Directly communicated threat
- Last resort behavior

# TRAP-18:


## Distal Characteristics (10)

- Personal grievance and moral outrage
- Framed by an ideology
- Failure to affiliate
- Dependence on the virtual community
- Thwarting of occupational goals

# TRAP-18:

## Distal Characteristics (10)

- Changes in thinking and emotion
- Failure of sexual pair-bonding
- Mental disorder
- Creative and innovative
- History of criminal violence



Does TRAP-18 work in the real world?

**Sensitivity**—does it identify those at risk?

**Specificity**—does it identify those who are not at risk?

# Meloy, Roshdi, Glaz-Ocik & Hoffmann, JTAM, 2:3


- “Investigating the individual terrorist in Europe”
- N=22 terrorists, 7 of whom were in 3 autonomous cells
- Reliability, content validity of TRAP-18; comparison of lone actors and autonomous cells

# Interrater reliability

- Kappa mean = .895 (0.69-1.0)


# Meloy et al., JTAM, 2:3

10 Characteristics of the European Terrorists (N=22)	Individual Terrorist	Autonomous Cell
Personal Grievance and Moral Outrage*****	100%	100%
Framed by an Ideology*****	100%	100%
Failure to Affiliate with an Extremist Group	20%	0%
Dependence on the Virtual Community	40%	0%
Thwarting of Occupational Goals	85,7%	71,40%
Radicalization Fueled by Structure of Thinking and Change in Emotion*****	100%	100%
Failure of Sexual-Intimate Pair Bonding	78,57%	28,57%
Mental Disorder	53,85%	28,57%
Greater Creativity and Innovation	60%	71,43%
Predatory (criminal) Violence by history	21,43%	100%



# Meloy et al., JTAM, 2:3

Warning Behavior Typology (N=22)	Individual Terrorist	Autonomous Cell
Pathway*****	100%	100%
Fixation*****	100%	100%
Identification	92,31%	100%
Novel Aggression	37,5%	50%
Energy Burst*****	100%	100%
Leakage	83,33%	100%
Direct Threat	20%	0%
Last resort*****	100%	100%



# Meloy & Gill (N=111 lone terrorists), JTAM, 1:2016

- U.S. and Europe
- Convicted of their active planning or died during commission of their attack
- 1990-2014 (25 years)
- “the use of threat or action designed to influence the government or intimidate the public and/or advance a political, religious, or secular cause.”

# Method

- Utilized Gill codebook to identify data which would allow for coding of TRAP-18 variables as present or absent
- Coded entire sample
- Compared across ideologies
- Compared across thwarted or successful attacks

# Lone Actor Terrorists

■ Pathway	80%
■ Fixation	77%
■ Identification	77%
■ Novel Aggression	17%
■ Energy Burst	8%
■ Leakage	85%
■ Last Resort	28%
■ Directly communicated threat	22%

# Lone Actor Terrorists

- Personal grievance and moral outrage 78%
- Framed by an ideology 100%
- Failure to affiliate with extremist group 29%
- Dependence on virtual community 49%
- Thwarting of occupational goals 55%
- Changes in thinking and emotion 88%
- Failure of sexual intimate pair bonding 84%
- Mental illness 41%
- Creativity and innovation 29%
- Criminal violence by history 30%

# Operational Application

- 70% demonstrated at least half of the TRAP variables
- >76% had 4 warning behaviors: pathway, fixation, identification, and leakage

# Comparison of ideologies

- Jihadist (n=38)
- Extreme right wing (n=43)
- Single issue (n=30)

# Comparative Ideologies

- Equivalence across all variables except for four:
  - Personal grievance and moral outrage
  - Dependence on the virtual community
  - Fixation
  - Thwarting of occupational goals

# Operational Application

- TRAP-18 appears to be useful regardless of ideology driving the terrorist motivation

# Successful v. Thwarted Attackers

- Successful (n=67): carried out the attack
- Thwarted (n=44): plots that were developed by a lone terrorist and then were interrupted/stopped by law enforcement intervention and led to a conviction

# Successful Attackers

- More likely to fail at sexual-intimate pair bonding ( $\phi = .293$ )
- More likely to be creative and innovative ( $\phi = .190$ )
- More likely to be fixated ( $\phi = .204$ )
- Less likely to be dependent on the virtual community ( $\phi = .317$ )
- Less likely to evidence pathway behavior ( $\phi = .264$ )

# Operational Application

- More socially isolated, more time to plan and prepare without interruption
- Need to think “outside the box” as threat assessors for innovative (not done before) tactics
- Watch for indications of obsessive preoccupation with a cause, most likely through social media *postings*
- Less *interaction* with like minded true believers through listservs, blogs, etc.
- Aggressively investigate for pathway behavior

# Monahan and Steadman, 1996

- Violent storms and violent people. American Psychologist 51:931-938
- **Watching**—cluster of distal characteristics > monitor the case
- **Warning**—one proximal warning behavior > actively manage the case
- Code warning behaviors first

# Calhoun and Weston Threat Management Lessons

- Approach problems with innovation and creativity
- Keep the subject's dignity in mind at all times

# THE PSYCHOLOGY OF **STALKING**

Clinical and Forensic Perspectives



Edited by **J. REID MELOY**

# Elements of Criminal Stalking

- Unwanted pattern of pursuit
- Implicit or explicit threat
- Induction of fear or intent to induce fear in the victim

# Current Findings on Stalking

- An old behavior, a new crime
- Perpetrators are males, victims are females
- Age of both in 20s to 30s
- Prior criminal, psychiatric, and drug abuse histories
- Epidemiology (Spitzberg, 2007)
  - 8-32% women victimized during lifetime
  - 2-13% men victimized during lifetime
  - Method sensitive

# NCVS Stalking Victimization in the United States, 2009

- During a 12 month period, 14 out of 1000 adults were victims of stalking
- Young and divorced or separated women
- Less than half report to police
- 25% report cyberstalking
- 75% knew their offender in some capacity (30% prior sexual intimate)
- Risk decreases with age (18-24 highest risk)
- Victims of two or more races had highest frequency of stalking (32:1000) per year

■ “The exotic becomes erotic.”

■ Daryl Bem, Cornell University, 1996

# Further Demographics

- Stalkers are average IQ range
- Most are unemployed or underemployed
- Mean duration 2 years (10% >5 years)
- Modal duration 1 month
- If it exceeds two weeks, will go on for months
- Crime is only recognized in Westernized developed countries

# Mullen Typology (Am J Psychiatry, 1999, 2000, 2009)

- Rejected (most violent and longest duration)
- Intimacy Seekers (longest duration)
- Incompetent
- Resentful
- Predator (most violent and sexual)
  - Good discriminant validity: employment, stalking duration, number of methods, threats, assaults, prior criminal convictions.
  - Mean age 31-41 years, 69-100% males
  - No initial interjudge reliability

# RECON Typology—Mohandie, Meloy, McGowan and Williams (J Forensic Sciences, 2006)

- Intimate (n=502)
- Acquaintance (n=129)
- Public Figure (n=271)
- Private Stranger (n=103)
  - N=1005
  - Interjudge reliability 0.95 (ICC)
  - Discriminant validity

# Intimate Type (n=502)—most dangerous of four groups

- 94% male
- 50% violent criminal records
- 11% psychotic
- 67% use drugs
- More frequent and proximity-based approaches
- 83% threaten
- 92% reoffend
- Recidivism in 1.6 months
- 74% violent

# Psychiatric Characteristics: Cumulative Studies

- Axis I diagnoses: drug abuse or dependence, mood disorders, schizophrenia
- Delusional disorder unlikely (<10%)
- Axis II diagnoses: Cluster B, paranoid, dependent, OCPD
- Antisocial PD and psychopathy unlikely (<10%)
- Only 20% psychotic at time of stalking
- A pathology of attachment: often preoccupied

# Bartholomew's Model of Adult Attachment

---

		<b>+</b>	<b>Self Reps</b>	<b>-</b>
<b>+</b>	<b>Other Reps</b>	<b>Secure</b>	<b>Preoccupied</b>	
<b>-</b>		<b>Dismissive</b>	<b>Fearful</b>	

Source: K. Bartholomew, 1990

# RECON study violence data

- 46% violent
- 30% violent toward object of pursuit
- 26% damaged or stole property
- 7% violent toward third party
- 2% killed or injured a pet
- 5% sexually assaulted
- 3% abducted object of pursuit
- 19% used a weapon (knives most common)
- 0.5% committed homicide

# RECON Types-**Personal violence**

■ Intimate	56%
■ Acquaintance	27%
■ Public Figure	1.3%
■ Private Stranger	19%

# Stalking and Violence: Cumulative Data

- Overall frequency is 20-40%
- Average is one third are violent
- Prior sexually intimate frequency >50%
- Private stalking: No weapon, minor injury, cars at risk as weapons and targets
- Homicide rate 0.25% (1:400)
- 80% of spousal homicide victims previously stalked by the perpetrator

# NCVS 2009 Survey

- 21% Attacked victim
- 12.3% hit, slapped, knocked down
- 4.2% choked or strangled
- 4.0% attacked with weapon (22% handgun)
- 3.5% chased or dragged by car
- 1.6% raped or sexually assaulted
- 7.3% attacked in some other way
- 15% attacked another person or pet

# Predicting Femicide

- Kropp & Cook, Int Handbook of Threat Assessment, 2014
  - Proprietariness (Ownership)
  - Possession or availability of firearm
  - Escalation in severity or frequency of violence
  - Mental problems
  - Stalking
  - Recent separation or divorce, especially first few months

# Does the stalker pose a threat?

- Posing a threat is much more significant than making a threat
- Fein & Vossekuil, 1995, 1998, 1999
- U.S. Secret Service ECSP

# Richard Farley: 1988 ESL Sunnyvale



# Case Facts (1)

- February 16, 1988 at ESL in Sunnyvale, CA
- Killed 7 employees
- Wounded 3 others, including object of his obsession, Laura Black
- Surrendered to SWAT team 5 hours later
- Serving life sentence in San Quentin

# Case Facts (2)

- Terminated 21 mos. previously for sexually harassing Laura Black.
- She consistently rejected his overtures
- Nearly 4 years of letters/messages, notes, on her desk, on car, in doorway; incessant phone calls and messages
- Followed her to aerobics class, watched her at company softball games
- She got TRO 2 weeks before incident
- He circled in company parking lot 2 hours prior to attack, in van with arsenal

# Video Interview

- Farley video interview following arrest, conviction, and imprisonment conducted by Chris Hatcher, Ph.D.
- Thanks to Kris Mohandie, Ph.D., for permission to use
- See California Supreme Court decision, 2009, People v. Farley, for further details

# Excerpts from Farley's Letters to Laura Black

- “You can’t push me. Do you have any idea of what I’m willing to do if I’m pushed beyond what I’m willing to accept? (Feb. 13, 1987)
  - 12 months prior to attack
- “If I have to choose between being with Mei [his current girlfriend] and fighting with you, Mei will lose.” (July, 1987)
  - 7 months prior to attack

# Excerpts from Farley's Letters to Laura Black

- “I wouldn’t show my letters to anyone anymore. They might get the wrong impression and do something stupid and it would spiral beyond any hope of recovery... You could always commit suicide [since he was “testing” her], but since I don’t have much regard for human life, that isn’t going to hurt me... I have your parents’ address, so if you run I can follow.” (November 13, 1987)
  - 3 months prior to attack

# About Two Weeks Before the Attack

HI LAURA

Peterson came over to my truck while I was waiting for you. He told me to move. I told him, he didn't own the road and I have no intention of moving. He then asked me when I was going to leave you alone. I told him probably never (I should have said when you let me call you up and ask you out like a normal person and you accept). He then threatened me and said "I was going to jail."

I told him that's nice and he was going to cause a lot of trouble.

You'd better tell him to mind his own business. I didn't listen to Chuck and I don't intend to listen to him and it's not in your best interest for him to interfere.

He doesn't have any idea what he's getting into. You'd better tell him, I'd better never see any police around me.

Take care

Rich Farley

CALL ME SUNDAY MORNING

MF

# STALKING, THREATENING, and ATTACKING PUBLIC FIGURES



**A Psychological and Behavioral Analysis**

Edited by

J. Reid Meloy • Lorraine Sheridan • Jens Hoffmann

# Public Figure Stalking

- Very high prevalence of (>80%) mental disorder among those who abnormally approach (US, UK, Netherlands, Sweden, Canada)

# Problematic Approaches



Scouse about that . . . the lad gives Di a kiss Pictures: ARTHUR EDWARDS

- Approach following abnormal communication associated with six factors:
  - No direct threats
  - Exhibits severe mental illness symptoms
  - Multiple means of communication to target
  - Multiple contacts and secondary targets
  - Requests for help
  - No antagonistic communication (Meloy et al., J Forensic Sciences, 2011)

# However, those who directly communicate threats can also approach

- Dietz Hollywood 23.0%
- Dietz US Congress 33.0%
- Scalora US Congress 21.4%
- Scalora Random Congress 41.3%
- Meloy Hollywood 35.0%

# Public Figure Attacks

- See: Meloy J.R. (2011). Approaching and attacking public figures: a contemporary analysis of communications and behavior. In: C. Chauvin, ed., Threatening Communications and Behavior. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.
- Available for free at [www.nap.edu](http://www.nap.edu)
- Revised and expanded in 2015: Journal of Threat Assessment and Management

# Attacks and Assassinations



# The importance of *fixation*

- Pathological fixations are obsessive preoccupations which result in deterioration of subject's intimate, social, and occupational life
- They focus upon a *person* or a *cause*

# What is associated with “fixation”?

- Obsessively and irrationally pursuing a highly idiosyncratic personal grievance or cause

■ Death or serious injury	0.54 phi
■ Attacker a loner	1.0
■ Warning behaviors shown	0.76
■ Definitely psychotic	0.76
■ Definitely deluded	0.76

- James et al., Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 116:334-344, 2007

# *Grandiosity and entitled reciprocity*

- Exaggerated sense of self importance in communications (delusional or not)
  - Predicted an approach (UK Royal Family)
- Public figure owes the subject time and attention because of the subject's time and attention paid to the public figure
  - Possible predictor of resentment, perhaps aggression

# BRF Data

- Grandiosity predicted an approach or no approach among communicators with 73% accuracy
  - Aspect of pathological narcissism
  - Supports “entitled reciprocity” (Meloy et al., 2008)
  - Likely to be delusional, not just exaggerated
  - AUC 0.74 (95% CI 0.65-0.82)

DATE RECEIVED July 30, 2008

04 AUG 2008

25396

The Prince of Wales's Office

Dear Charles,

God dam it, God dam you! Charles  
Prince of Wales!

You know that the Catholic Church is a  
cult, right? You do know that, don't you? Well,  
it is. And you shouldn't be worshipping  
the virgin Mary. She's not the Queen of  
Heaven. I AM! I'm God's Wife,  
and you better make room for me there  
now! How dare you make me grovel in  
the dirt, Charles, I'm your Heavenly  
Mother! And you best start respecting  
me as such with a whole lot of hugs  
and kisses (on the cheek), well wishes,  
and tender, loving care, or you are going  
to die a very long death starting  
right now!

Stick to the Word of God, Charles.





# Stalking Risk Profile

- MacKenzie et al., 2009
- Monash University, Victoria, Australia
- Risk of Stalking Violence
- Risk of Persistence
- Risk of Recurrence
- Risk of Psychosocial Damage to Stalker
- Management
- Public Figure Addendum

# Risk of Stalking Violence

- Red Flag Risk Factors
  - Suicidal ideation
  - Homicidal ideation
  - Last resort thinking
  - High risk psychotic phenomena
  - Psychopathy

# Risk of Stalking Violence

- General Risk Factors
  - Prior violence
  - Property damage
  - Access to or affinity with weapons
  - Approach behaviors
  - Impulsivity
  - Poor emotional control
  - Substance misuse

# Risk of Stalking Violence by Motivational Type

- Rejected
- Resentful
- Intimacy Seekers
- Incompetent Suitors
- Predatory stalkers

# For example,

- Rejected
  - Threats
  - Breached restraining order
  - Awareness of victim location and accessibility
  - Disputes over children/shared property
  - Elevated anger/thoughts of vengeance

# Guidelines for Stalking Assessment and Management (SAM)

- Kropp, Hart & Lyon, 2008
- [www.proactive-resolutions.com](http://www.proactive-resolutions.com)

# Management Strategies & Conclutory Opinions

- Recommend strategies for managing stalking risks--interviewing
- Document summary judgments of:
  - Case prioritization
  - Continued stalking
  - Serious physical harm
  - Reasonableness of fear
  - Immediate action required
  - Case review scheduling

# Risk Management (Meloy, Am J Psychotherapy, 1997)

- Team approach
- Personal responsibility for safety
- Document/record
- Do not initiate contact!
- Protective (restraining) orders
- Law enforcement and prosecution
- Treatment if indicated
- Segregation and incarceration if necessary
- Periodic violence risk assessments
- “Dramatic moments”



*"What sort of flowers say, 'I promise to obey the restraining order'?"*

# Protection (Restraining) Orders

- 32 studies (Spitzberg, 2002)
- 23,799 cases
- Noncompliance 40%
- Escalation of violence or stalking 21%

# Decide each case separately

- Have previous orders been effective?
- Has there been a history of violence toward the protectee?
- How effective is local enforcement?
- How obsessed is he?
  - Frequency of thought
  - Affective intensity




*"...I feel it made his fantasies come true.  
I'm sitting in front of him, and that's  
what he wants."*

**Madonna Ciccone  
Testimony Jan. 3, 1996  
People v. Robert Hoskins**



christ

MADONNA  
LOVE  
ME



6150  
20194  
20194

LOVE  
wife  
127'96

127  
MA DONNA  
STALKER

127'96



B. Smaller

*"He's playing very hard to get—he's got a restraining order."*

# Calhoun and Weston Threat Management Lessons

- Stick to the facts and avoid “what if”
- Hope for the best, plan for the worst

# Email received Feb. 29, 2012

- After seeing what a *moron* thinks about. Your website is SICK as any child's drawing. You belong in jail. The nonsense on your website *means you are* a psychotic killer and needs to be locked up. You *ignorant moron*. People like you *always* get it wrong. *ALWAYS*. We *always* find out how wrong you are AFTER someone's in jail 20 years. Or after they get the death penalty. *Mother fuckers* like you need to be stopped. What a piece of *shit* you are. *You lie*. Then you ask for money. You gay looking *dirtbag*. You need a camera not a website. You seem to think you are something important. You're a joke.

# www.threattrriage.com

- Psycholinguistic content analysis developed by Sharon Smith, Ph.D. (Smith, 2008)—9 variables
- This particular note:
  - Rude language reduced threat of action
  - Low conceptual complexity reduced threat of action
  - Indicating victim increased threat of action
  - Multiple contacts increased threat of action
  - Assessment: Low Risk (10% false negative) for action (approaching, stalking, or attacking)

# Threatening Communications

- Very common among Intimates (>50%)
- NCVS 2009 Survey 43.2% threatened
- Most are false positives (41-75%)
- Relationship to violence could be positive, negative, or none
- Instrumental or expressive
- False negative rates 13-23% for prior relationship stalking
- Beta weights  $-0.24$  to  $0.36$ : predictive correlations

# New Threat Research

- Warren et al., Psychological Medicine, 38:599-605, 2008
- Warren et al. Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 29:141-154, 2011
- Warren et al., Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 2012, published online
- Warren et al., In Meloy & Hoffmann, eds. International Handbook of Threat Assessment, Oxford Univ. Press, 2014

# General Findings

- Significantly higher rates of subsequent violence toward target threatened, others, and self at one year and ten years post-threat.
- Similar to findings from MacDonald, Homicidal Threats, Charles C. Thomas, 1968
- First studies since then

# Some specific findings

- After 10 years, subjects who criminally threatened (N=613) had:
  - 44% risk of any violent offense
  - 14% risk of any victimization of target
  - 10% assault risk toward target
  - 1% risk of homicide of target

# Some specific findings

- After one year followup, subjects who had threatened (N=144) had:
  - 42% risk of reoffense
  - 23% risk of violent reoffense
  - 0.7% risk of killing target
  - 12.5% risk of assaulting target
  - 60% of all violence directed toward target

# Take home message

- Consider all direct threats serious
- Remember the “intimacy effect:” threats are more predictive of subsequent violence the more intimate the prior relationship has been with the target (Calhoun & Weston, 2003)

# Warren et al. threat typology

- Screammers
- Signalers
- Shielders
- Schemers
- Shockers

■ Int Handbook of Threat Assessment, 2014

# Workplace Assessment of Violence Risk: WAVR-21

- First published 2007; third edition 2016
- Developed by Stephen White and Reid Meloy
- eWAVR coming
- A “structured professional judgment” instrument (SPJ), the first to address targeted violence in a workplace or higher education setting

# What is The WAVR-21?

- A “structured professional judgment” instrument for
  - organizing and coding threat case information, to
  - assess targeted violence risk
- Includes a 21-item assessment tool for “Professional Users” - clinical and forensic
- As well as a Short Form for “Corporate Users”: members of internal threat management teams
- May be applied to wide group of subjects: employees, former employees, students, faculty
- Coding is updated throughout a case as information develops or changes

# Major Research & Content Influences

- US Secret Service targeted violence research (ECSP)
- Mass murder research
- Stalking research
- Affective/Predatory violence research
- Calhoun & Weston (pathway markers)
- General aggression/impulsivity research
- “Traditional” static violence risk factors
- Workplace homicide case studies
- Workplace/campus violence case management experience

## Red Flag Indicators—first five items

- Motives for Violence
- Homicidal Ideas, Fantasies, or Preoccupation
- Violent Intentions and Expressed Threats
- Weapons Skill and Access
- Pre-attack Planning and Preparation

# Items 6-11

Stalking or Menacing Behavior

Current Job Problems

Extreme Job Attachment

Loss, Personal Stressors and Negative Coping

Entitlement and Other Negative Traits

Lack of Conscience and Irresponsibility

# Items 12-16

Anger Problems

Depression and Suicidality

Paranoia and Other Psychotic Symptoms

Substance Abuse

Isolation

# Items 17-21

History of Violence, Criminality, and Conflict

Domestic/intimate Partner Violence

Situational and Organizational Contributors to  
Violence

Stabilizers and Buffers Against Violence

Organizational Impact of Real or Perceived Threats

## *Example:* **Item 1. Motives for Violence**

Key Question: *What is motivating the individual to make the statements or engage in the behaviors that have brought him or her to attention, and to what extent does he or she see violence as a legitimate means to an end?*

Risk Indicators: *Evidence of felt motive to act violently as a legitimate means to address a grievance or achieve an objective, e.g., to seek revenge, “justice”; end pain; gain notoriety; bring attention to or solve a problem.*

# WAVR Judgment for each variable

- Absent
- Present
- Prominent
- Recent change

Case/Name Identification: Richard Farley Date

Completed: \_\_\_\_\_

	Risk Factor Items	Absent	Present	Prominent	Recent Change (>, 0, <)*
1.	Motives for Violence			X	
2.	Homicidal Ideas, Violent Fantasies or Preoccupation			X	
3.	Violent Intentions and Expressed Threats			X	
4.	Weapons Skill and Access			X	
5.	Pre-Attack Planning and Preparation			X	>
6.	Stalking or Menacing Behavior			X	>
7.	Current Job Problems			X	
8.	Extreme Job Attachment	X			
9.	Loss, Personal Stressors and Negative Coping			X	
10.	Entitlement and Other Negative Traits			X	
11.	Lack of Conscience and Irresponsibility			X	
12.	Anger Problems			X	
13.	Depression and Suicidality	X			
14.	Paranoia and Other Psychotic Symptoms	X			
15.	Substance Abuse	X			
16.	Isolation	X			
17.	History of Violence, Criminality, and Conflict		X		
18.	Domestic/Intimate Partner Violence	i			
19.	Situational and Organizational Contributors to Violence			X	
20.	Stabilizers and Buffers Against Violence	prominent	present	absent X	
<b>Additional Item: Organizational Impact</b>					
21.	Organizational Impact of Real or Perceived Threats			X	

# Interrater Reliability Studies to Date


- Overall presence rating for all coders, good, ICC1=0.67
- Overall presence rating for psychologists, excellent, ICC1=0.76
- Workplace violence risk, fair to good ICC
- Serious physical harm, fair to good ICC
- Item variability from excellent to poor, most in fair to good range ICC
- Meloy JR, White SG, Hart S (2013). J Forensic Sciences. Available at [www.drreidmeloy.com](http://www.drreidmeloy.com)

# WAVR V3

- eWAVR V3
- Some modification of variable definitions
- Enhanced commentary for clinicians and nonclinicians
- Completely revised and expanded administration and technical manual (+300 pages)
- [www.specializedtraining.com](http://www.specializedtraining.com)
- [Wtsglobal.com](http://Wtsglobal.com) for trainings

# Calhoun and Weston and Meloy Threat Management Lessons

- Manage problems as long as they need managing
- Plan ahead, look back



# INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF THREAT ASSESSMENT

EDITED BY **J. REID MELOY** AND **JENS HOFFMANN**

OXFORD

# JTAM



# Networking Resources

- Association of Threat Assessment Professionals ([atapworldwide.org](http://atapworldwide.org))
- Canadian Association of Threat Assessment Professionals ([catap.org](http://catap.org))
- Association of European Threat Assessment Professionals ([aetap.eu](http://aetap.eu))
- Asia Pacific Association of Threat Assessment Professionals ([apatap.org](http://apatap.org))

- Fein & Vossekuil, Protective Intelligence and Threat Assessment Investigations (1998)
- Mohandie, School Violence Threat Management (2000)
- Calhoun & Weston, Contemporary Threat Management (2003)
- Deisinger et al., Handbook for Campus Threat Assessment and Management Teams (2008)
- Meloy & Hoffmann, The International Handbook of Threat Assessment (2014)

# The map is not the territory

- Theoretical models and their measurement will never exactly reflect reality

# Sherlock Holmes

- “I think you know me well enough, Watson, to understand that I am by no means a nervous man. At the same time it is stupidity rather than courage to refuse to recognize danger when it is close upon you.”
  - The Final Problem, December, 1893

# Thank You!

- [reidmeloy@gmail.com](mailto:reidmeloy@gmail.com)
- [www.DrReidMeloy.com](http://www.DrReidMeloy.com)
- @reidmeloy